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Abstract 
Anthony Giddens’ Structuration Theory is probably one of the sociological theories more 
directly referenced and more widely used, in a variety of ways, in organizational research. Why 
is that, and what does it mean for organizational research? In this paper we explore this issue by 
reviewing some early, influential contributions, within the organizational field, that used 
Giddens’ theory as the main reference. We will show that the actual utilizations of such theory 
are very heterogeneous in many relevant concepts, although they are all moved by similar 
theoretical needs. We also propose that in order to properly answer to those needs, 
organizational research should focus on some key elements that, while being central in 
Giddens’ contribution, are not always interpreted consistently by “Giddensian” organization 
scholars. Finally, we will argue that it is possible for the organization reflection, even when it is 
not built upon Structuration Theory, to share and realize Giddens’ main “message” to the 
organizational discipline: the need for an organization theory truly based on an epistemological 
view that allows to overcome the objectivist / subjectivist dilemma. 
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Giovanni Masino, Università di Ferrara 
Bruno Maggi, Università di Bologna e Università degli Studi di Milano 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Organizational studies have developed a remarkable interest in Giddens’ 
Structuration Theory (1976, 1984). Some scholars look at Structuration Theory 
(ST) principally as a general frame of reference providing the required 
ontological and epistemological features needed to understand organization as 
a process. In this sense, ST is considered a valuable perspective mainly because 
it helps to grasp the dynamics of organizational replication and change. 
Other authors refer to ST as a source of specific concepts (propositions and 
substantive hypothesis), regardless of the epistemological and the 
methodological framework that are implicit in their speculations. Thus, a 
heuristic usefulness is acknowledged to ST for studying specific organizational 
phenomena: technology, power and domination, communication and 
information systems, organizational culture and so on.  
Finally, there are authors placed at the cross-road of such ways to look at 
the ST as a relevant scheme for organizational analysis. 
The contributions of the authors that we considered in this critical review, 
prevalently coming from North American and British areas, have been 
published within a range of time that covers the eighties and nineties: Ranson, 
Hinings, Greenwood (1980), Riley (1983), Barley (1986; 1990), Barley, Tolbert 
(1997), Wilmott (1981; 1987), Orlikowski (1992), Orlikowski, Robey (1991), 
DeSanctis, Poole (1994), Leflaive (1996). 
Even if these authors deal with different research issues, either from a 
theoretical or an empirical point of view, and even if there is a clear 
heterogeneity in the interpretations given to the ST itself, a common theme can 
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be clearly identified in both the dissatisfaction for the perspectives which 
traditionally guided most organizational studies, and the necessity to transcend 
their dualistic visions, especially the one concerning the relationship between 
structure and action. 
Our paper proposes the following reflections. 
- An overall interpretation of the reasons inducing a substantial number of 
organizational researchers to seek a new frame of reference, alternative to the 
traditional ones, i.e. objectivist and subjectivist approaches. Objectivist 
approaches draw the attention to organizational structures conceived as formal 
configuration of activities, and conceive action as being subordinate to the 
aprioristic structural constraints. Subjectivist approaches focus on motivations, 
personal experiences and sense-making of actors in interaction. An alternative 
to both these perspectives should incorporate structure and action in one 
theoretical framework, in order to explain how organizational structures 
change over time. We will also propose an interpretation of the reasons 
inducing scholars of a research field that is not exclusively sociological towards 
social theory. 
- A review and a commentary of some relevant contributions, in order to 
highlight how ST has been transposed in organizational theory, with a peculiar 
concern for some topics that are salient for the conceptualization and 
understanding of organizational change. Considering the origin of ST, the 
discussion of these contributions needs to be referenced to the sociological field 
and to the organizational one as well. 
- A selection of classical topics in organization studies to which ST can 
bring a contribution in the overcoming of the difficulties against which both 
subjectivist and objectivist approaches run up, concerning especially the 
interpretation and explanation of organizational change. 
- Finally, we will argue that Giddens’ ST can help organization theorists to 
conceptualize organizational phenomena in a way that is truly alternative, in 
epistemological terms, to mainstream approaches. In this respect, ST can 
 3 
 
represent a useful epistemological comparison reference even for theories that 
are not based on it, like, for example, the Theory of Organizational Action 
(Teoria dell’Agire Organizzativo, TAO), proposed by Bruno Maggi (1984/1990; 
2003). This theory, while not based on Giddens’ work, shares with ST the key 
elements that define and position both ST and TAO in clear epistemological 
opposition to social and organizational mainstream theories. 
The choice of the contributions reviewed, other than obviously depending 
from our bounded knowledge of this literature, takes into account some criteria 
of “relevance” related to the goals of our analysis. We have considered those 
articles in which the authors examine: 
- their attitudes toward ST; 
- their expectations from sociological theory; 
- the degree of satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) of expectations generated by 
ST, in comparison with other general frames proposed in the sociological 
speculation; 
- their translation into organizational terms of ST as a whole, or of some 
parts of it, either epistemological or substantive. 
Brief and vague references to Giddens’ scheme, without a minimum of 
analysis and examination of how to transpose ST to an external field of studies, 
will be ignored in this paper. 
 
Theoretical needs and shared elements in “Giddensian” organizational 
contributions 
The first task of our survey of the “Giddensian” research stream in 
organizational studies is a descriptive one. The main question is: what does 
characterize, in its general features, this research stream? More precisely: what 
are the common traits, somehow related to Giddens’ Theory, of the above-
mentioned numerous and heterogeneous contributions of theory and research? 
We believe that a possible answer should be articulated in some fundamental 
points: 
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First, the common reference by these authors to a conceptual outline, 
coming from a field that is external to organizational theory, must be 
emphasized. This fact requires a brief but necessary comment. 
In defining social theory as an “external” field, we do not mean 
“unrelated” or “not appropriated”. It is worth calling the attention to the fact 
that organizational thinking, traditionally and for the type of the research object 
itself, is interdisciplinary in character. Several branches of social sciences have 
considerably contributed to the organizational reflection and, at the same time, 
they have been enriched by it. Most social phenomena take place in every single 
organization as well as in the whole societal system. As a consequence, the 
understanding of organizational action is strictly linked to the understanding of 
societal environment; on the other side, organization theory provides a 
significant contribution to sociology for several substantive issues. 
Indeed, for a long time, organizational thought has absorbed some of the 
main conceptual frames coming from social theory, while organization theory 
itself has produced autonomous frames for the study of organizations as social 
systems, some of which have later been used by social theory. 
Thus, we think that the emphasis on the permeability between 
autonomous theoretical fields shifts the interpretation of concepts like structure 
and action to a more general level of discussion. Indeed, this is precisely what 
most of the already mentioned authors do: they not only refer to ST, but also to 
other sociological theories. There is no doubt that the discussion about the 
limits of traditional perspectives in organization analysis is thusly enriched, but 
also the complexity of the discussion is increased. 
An analysis of the advantages and the disadvantages ST can bring to the 
study of organizations cannot be disconnected from a reflection at the level of 
social theory itself, and from a precise comparison with other conceptions of 
social action and social systems. We shall come back to this subject when we 
consider how appropriate the explicit and implicit references to this external 
field are. 
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A second set of common goals that can be found among the 
“Giddensians” lies within the organizational thought itself. It concerns the 
shared discontent for the traditional perspectives of organizational theory. 
We argued in the previous point that exchanges between social theory and 
a relevant part of the organization discipline has brought to the latter several 
perspectives that the epistemological debate has produced in the former. 
However, it must be said that up to now, (orthodox) organization theory has 
been dominated by some of these perspectives. Since the beginning of the XXth 
century, the prevailing conception of the organizational phenomena was 
objectivist, i.e. oriented by knowledge strategies which are deeply embedded in 
positivism and neo-positivism in methodological terms. 
Within this conception can be located, for example, the structural-
functionalist school, which provided functional explanations, a strategy 
borrowed from biological sciences. Functionalism, in a large sense, is still the 
most important perspective in organization field, as far as the quantitative 
proportion of theorization and empirical research is concerned. Together with 
functionalism, perspectives aimed to (neo)positivistic explanations have a large 
diffusion. 
These perspectives, actually much more differentiated than it can appear 
from this synthetic picture, share the common goal of discovering the “general 
laws” which govern organizational facts, neglecting from their investigation 
domain the sense that intentional agents attribute to the organizational action in 
which they participate. 
Since the second half of seventies of the XXth Century, objectivist 
interpretations of organization have been contrasted by subjectivist ones, which 
have acquired an increasing degree of popularity among scholars; they aim to a 
description and a direct comprehension of the organization as it is experienced 
in the everyday life by the actors, and of the sense they attribute to their 
interactions. These proposals, deeply-rooted in the phenomenological sociology 
(especially the sociology of knowledge), had a particular success. 
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Organizations, like every social system, are seen as socially constructed by the 
actors. As such, the meaning of organization can be fully grasped by the 
researcher ex post facto, because only during and after the (inter)actions actors 
make sense of them. 
Certainly both objectivist and subjectivist conceptions highlighted salient 
aspects of organization; however, their reification of organization generates an 
irreconcilable opposition between the structural elements and the intentionality 
of agents. Structure is usually conceived as an external reality, relatively fixed 
and enduring.  
Structure(s) holds supremacy on action in the objectivist conception. It is 
conceived as the set of the formalized prescriptive roles, procedures, tasks, 
hierarchical relations: in brief, structure is an entity preceding and molding 
actions of individuals (or even their personalities). 
On the contrary, the subjectivist conception assigns the primacy to action. 
Structure is conceived as patterned regularities and processes of interaction: in 
other words, structure is an unintended (by)product resulting from the 
countless day-to-day interactions, an interpretative “strait-jacket” against which 
an actor aware of its socially constructed being tries to preserve his/her 
autonomy. 
At the origin of the “Giddensian” organizational contributions there is the 
necessity, that the authors make clear, to avoid both the imperialism of the 
strategic actor on the institutional contest, with the related extreme 
indeterminism, and the opposite rigid determinist vision. The need of such 
overcoming reveals itself most clearly when one wants to investigate the 
conditions under which organizational changes take place. 
A third common point is the shared belief that ST provides a solution to 
the limits of the traditional perspectives, especially “the unhelpful contrasting of 
structure and action” (Ranson, Hinings, Greenwood, 1980). The necessary 
condition in order to fill the gap between structure and action is to incorporate 
them into a “more unified methodological and theoretical framework”. It 
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should be recognized, as Giddens proposes, that knowledgeable agents 
produce and reproduce structure within the praxis of their social life, and that 
the structural proprieties are at the same time the constraining and enabling 
media of action. 
These authors reject the dualism implied in those perspectives that reify 
structure and action, as they prefer a conception and an interpretative schema 
capable to set structure and action in a relation of mutual constitution. 
 
Why does Structuration Theory appear as a useful approach to some 
organizational theorists? 
Before discussing some of the main contributions of the cited authors, it 
can be useful to add to the previous description of the “Giddensian” 
organizational wave an interpretation of the reasons that, in our opinion, have 
driven those scholars toward ST. Again, we shall subdivide our argument into 
three points, while remaining at a very general level of analysis. 
a) Since Max Weber (1922a), organization has been conceptualized on 
several occasions by authoritative contributions as a specific kind of social 
action. Conversely, it has been largely recognized that social action, especially 
when it assumes the characteristics of collective action, must be in some degree 
an organized one. Starting from this definition, organization theory can refer 
back to the considerable and noteworthy epistemological, substantive and 
methodological reflections which have taken place in the wide field of social 
science. The fact that organizational theory refers to this wider debate, appears 
therefore not only pertinent but even necessary; in its absence, every new 
proposal of theoretical and interpretative scheme would certainly appear as 
“amateurish”. 
Besides these general matters, organization theory shares with other areas 
of social science a peculiar interest for the theme of structure, especially in 
terms of its variability and its relationship with action. This topic is indeed a 
crucial one for the comprehension and the explanation of organizational or any 
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societal change. In this sense, one of the earliest and fundamental “Giddensian” 
articles in the organizational field is paradigmatic, that of Ranson, Hinings, 
Greenwood (1980). The article begins by identifying of the issue of “explaining 
how organizational structures change over time” as the main conceptual problem to 
be solved. 
b) Giddens highlights merits and limitations of both objectivist and 
subjectivist perspectives in their conceptualization of social systems 
morphogenesis. The former draws all attention on the structural constraints 
which limit the range of options for the individuals; moreover, it denies 
individuals a significant capability of conscious monitoring, and therefore the 
ability to control their own behavior. The latter chooses the way of extreme 
indeterminism, denying that structures would have in any sense a reality of 
their own, except a symbolic one; structures in other terms are completely 
situated  in the actors’ mental processes. 
The objectivist rules out a relevant active role of the individuals  - i.e. to be 
autonomous and creative - in the reproduction of social systems; thus, this 
interpretative scheme is deprived of an essential requisite for the understanding 
of innovation and consequent changes: the intentional rationality of agents. 
The subjectivist conceptualization emphasizes how actors produce social 
reality, but this process - prevalently non-intentional in character - tends to 
objectify itself. Moreover, the subjectivist perspective moves from a naive 
idealism, as it understands the agent’s capability to question the “taken-for-
granted” as a manifestation of spontaneous conscience. This perspective loses 
sight, therefore, of precious elements for the understanding of social change: the 
relational nature of power, the character of intentionality that can be found in 
collective action, the historically development and co-evolution of 
psychogenesis and socio-genesis, and so on. 
The dichotomy between objectivist / subjectivist perspectives is accepted 
as an interpretive key of organizational thought in the contributions we will 
review in this paper. At the same time, such dichotomy is understood as an 
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opposition that needs to be overcome with a new conception that unifies the 
analysis of structure and action. The first authors within the organizational field 
who refer to ST in such a way are Ranson, Hinings, Greenwood (1980). They 
identify the definition of structure as the crucial point of dispute between the 
two perspectives: in the objectivist one, structure is understood as the formal 
configuration of roles and procedures, in other words, the prescribed 
framework of organization; the subjectivist one, on the other hand, conceives 
structure as the patterned regularities and processes of interaction. The former 
concentrates on the formal constraints and on the control of action, whereas the 
latter calls the attention on the informal structure, i.e. on what people actually 
do, on their possibility in displacing goals and subverting prescribed roles. Both 
conceptions emphasize salient aspects for the comprehension and 
understanding of organizational phenomena, but they fail to account for the 
issues highlighted by the rival approach. Then, organization theory needs a 
new frame of reference, one that would allow to understand both kinds of 
matters. 
Our analysis identifies two modalities of satisfying this need, i.e. two 
interpretations of Giddens’ proposal: some authors propose to overcome the 
dualism by linking traditional subjectivist and objectivist perspectives into a 
broader new framework; others propose to overcome the dualism through a third 
conception, alternative to the traditional ones. 
c) Some of the organizational contributions interpret ST according to a 
syncretistic approach, a cross-fertilization between the theoretical and empirical 
outcomes of the two perspectives that traditionally have occupied social theory 
and, as a consequence, organizational theory. They refer to ST as a theoretical 
locus in which the link of two classes of topics is fostered: structures as formal 
configurations and structures as patterned regularities. 
Another interpretation considers ST as the overcoming of the reifying 
conceptualization of structure. Incidentally, it must be recalled that a “third 
epistemological way” for the study of social action had been identified by Max 
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Weber within the Methodenstreit (Weber, 1922b). 
In both interpretations, the significance of connecting action and structure 
is stressed, by avoiding to make the former a simple epiphenomenon of the 
latter and vice versa. 
Now, we need to examine some topics treated by the considered authors 
more in detail, in order to grasp the differences between the two interpretive 
keys of ST The first work to analyze in detail is that, already cited, of Ranson 
and colleagues. It was followed by the brief but important critique of Wilmott 
(1981), by which the author outlines a different interpretation of Giddens’ 
Theory. 
The subsequent contributions aiming to an utilization of ST in 
organizational field refer (explicitly, for the most part) to one of these two 
seminal articles; however, it can be said that the interpretation of Ranson and 
colleagues seems to be the most diffused one. Given the heterogeneity of the 
examined contributions, we adopt a very selective scheme of reading, related to 
general but salient issues both for ST and organization theory. In the following 
paragraphs we will examine: 
- the understanding of organizational change; 
- the type of rationality underlying the individual’s choices and, as a 
consequence, the collective decisions and actions; 
- the concepts of structure and structuration 
 
Organizational change 
The focus on organizational change is common among “Giddensian” 
authors. Indeed, they share a critical standpoint toward traditional approaches. 
On one side, positivist and objectivist approaches face the issue of 
organizational change by proposing deterministic relationships between the 
structural change and exogenous (environmental and technological) 
contingencies. The concept of “change” is not different, in this case, from 
“passive adaptation”. On the other side, subjectivist approaches conceive 
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change as an erratic phenomenon, something that cannot be referred to a 
systemic logic since there’s no possibility to intentionally design or guide 
change. Thus, change is seen as an unpredictable phenomenon, emerging from 
the aggregation and the interaction of individual strategies and behaviors. A 
critical analysis of such traditional approaches reveals two fundamental 
theoretical necessities, which we will discuss separately: 
A) a need to grasp and interpret the two aspects within the same 
analytical framework: both the influence of exogenous factors, and the influence 
of individual strategies. The problem is not that of a separate explanation of 
such aspects, but their connection within a complete and unified framework. 
B) a need to understand the intentional dimension of organizational 
change, that is, the ability of key actors to design and change organization in a 
instrumental way toward goals (which are variable as well). This aspect is 
almost ignored in the positivist tradition - or, it is reduced to general laws of 
adaptation, so that not much is said about “intentionality” conceived as 
contextual and proactive action of change. Similarly, the same aspect is ignored 
in the subjectivist tradition too - or, it is reduced to the individual strategy level, 
since the consequences for the whole organization are indeterminated and 
unpredictable as well. 
Giddensians’ contributions show an important aspect. While the first need 
(A) is widely recognized, the second one (B) is much less shared.  
A) Some authors use the ST in order to integrate the two traditional 
approaches. According to Orlikowski and Robey (1991) “ the structuration 
perspective by synthesizing objective and subjective elements of social phenomena .. 
because structuration serves as a meta-theory, it does not preempt existing theories [of 
organization] .. rather, structuration theory provides a higher level of synthesis that 
permits us to see the connection between ongoing human activities, social processes, 
contexts of use, and enduring social structures.”. Thus, ST is not seen as an 
alternative approach, but a sort of irenics which reconciles the two conflicting 
traditional perspectives. According to these authors, ST does not substitute the 
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old perspectives, instead it helps to accept and connect them at a higher level of 
abstraction. Other authors share the same view. Ranson and colleagues (1980), 
for example, were the first ones to propose the use of ST in the organizational 
field as a link between adaptation theories and indetermination theories. Their 
proposal is based on Giddens’ idea of structure’s duality. According to their 
interpretation, duality means contemporary presence of different explanations 
of structural variability. According to an adaptation logic, technological and 
environmental contingencies impact upon structure in terms of change of its 
formal configuration, which in turns influences individual behavior by 
providing a major constraint to action. On the other side, agents interact 
according to “provinces of meaning” and “dependencies of power”, 
institutionalizing the practices as formalized relationships and procedures, that 
is, as constraints for future actions. As a whole, the process of organizational 
change results from the interaction of changes concerning shared meanings, 
power relationships, formal structures and exogenous contingencies. The 
authors affirm that “This more unified methodological and theoretical framework 
allows us to incorporate a number of ostensibly disparate perspectives: 
phenomenological perspectives .. traditional ahistorical organizational analysis of 
structural regularities .. and broader sociohistorical perspectives of economy and 
culture”. Thus, they affirm the relevance of ST as a meta-framework comprising 
syncretically different traditions, where conceptual differences are dissolved. 
Wilmott (1981) radically criticized the organizational reading of ST 
proposed by Ranson and other authors. According to Wilmott, the duality of 
structure as proposed by Giddens is not compatible with a syncretic linkage of 
the traditional perspectives. On the contrary, ST is to be seen as an alternative, 
epistemologically different approach. The crucial problem is not to connect 
theories with different epistemological backgrounds, but with different 
analytical levels, the agency level and the structural level. Structure is to be 
conceived as a set of properties giving a dynamic order to social practices and 
reproduced through action. Thus, the concept of duality serves to “locate” at 
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the analytical level the distinction between the realm of agency and the realm of 
structure. In a subsequent work, Wilmott (1987) proposes to use ST in order to 
analyze managerial work, in particular to appreciate how “ .. the social practices 
that constitute managerial work can be studied as the skilled accomplishment of agents 
and as an expression of the structural properties of systems of interaction”. 
Other authors use ST in a way similar to Wilmott’s proposal. Riley (1983), 
working on organizational culture, adopts ST in order to propose something 
completely different from traditional functionalist and interpretive readings. 
The author uses Giddens’ work as an alternative approach for studying social 
change. Riley states that “Structures exist only in their instantiation, and while 
systems may be conceptually analyzed, they do not exist in any concrete or ‘real’ sense 
as in the functionalist paradigm. Neither is the perspective purely interpretive, since 
individuals are the creators and carriers of structures that are generated via rules and 
resources .. Structuration theory, however, crosses the boundary between radical 
humanism and radical structuralism by its emphasis on deep economic and political 
structures in institutional analysis”. Riley emphasizes the usefulness of the ST in 
order to combine within a unified framework organizational change and 
replication :  “The simultaneous impact of individual and institutional influences leads 
to a situation in which the bias for ‘what has come before’ is transformed, and a change 
in the structuring process occurs. A central concern of structuration theory, therefore, 
is the identification of the conditions that govern the continuity - or transformation - of 
structures, and thus the reproduction of systems”. 
Leflaive (1996), in his contribution about power dynamics within 
organizations, sees organization as a reflexive system. For this reason, the 
author suggests to abandon the concept of power both as an attribute and as an 
element coming from the asymmetry of actors related to the control of 
information. Instead, building on ST, he proposes to conceive it as a collective 
capacity of the organizational process itself, a capacity to maintain and 
transform the organization. The surveillance processes are at the same time 
constituted and constitutive of the organization and of members as subjects 
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exercising power, and so they are open to both resistance and change. 
We can  summarize the discussion by emphasizing a shared need and two 
ways to interpret it. The shared need is to grasp organizational change in a 
more comprehensive way compared to what traditional approaches propose. 
The two interpretations of such necessity seem to be very different. The first one 
utilizes ST as a meta-theory connecting and comprehending syncretically 
theories with antithetical epistemological background. The second one sees ST 
as an actual alternative to traditional approaches, epistemologically and 
ontologically different from them. 
B) The second need that we identified, related to the intentionality implied 
in organizational changes, is much less diffused and shared between 
“Giddensian” authors. On the one side, this can be partially explained if one 
considers the lesser emphasis that Giddens himself put on the intentional 
consequences of action (compared to unintentional consequences), even if he 
comprises them in his analytical framework. This is partially due to the scope of 
ST as a general theory of social action. On the other side, we think that such lack 
of attention by “Giddensian” organization scholars may be a limit. We argue 
that a primary task of organization theorists interested in ST should be the 
evaluation of its usefulness when applied to a research field where the 
relevance of intentional change is crucial. Moreover, this should be even more 
relevant since traditional organization theories do not deal with intentional 
change through “satisficing solutions” (to say it with Simon's words): either in 
terms of unlimited capacity of intervention guided by objective rationality, 
passive adaptation, or as an indeterminate process. Barley and Tolbert (1997) 
briefly talk about the issue of the structural change as an intentional outcome of 
actions. However, they claim that intentional change must be triggered by 
contextual and/or exogenous changes in order to actually take place, otherwise 
the unintentional aspect prevails. Thus, they don’t seem to have a different 
approach from subjectivist theories. The authors state that : “.. we believe that 
contextual change .. changes in technology, cross-cultural contacts, economic 
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downturns and similar events .. is usually necessary before actors can assemble the 
resources and rationales that are necessary for collectively questioning scripted patterns 
of behavior. In the absence of contextual change, actors are more likely to replicate 
scripted behavior, and it is this propensity that makes institutions so persistent”. Thus, 
we can notice again a syncretic approach to ST, since they propose a 
combination of two ideas of change: the first as adaptation to exogenous shocks, 
and the second as the unpredictable outcome of a legitimization and 
sedimentation process of recurrent behaviors guided by individual strategies. 
De Sanctis and Poole (1994), using concepts taken from ST in order to 
study the relationships between technology and structure, indirectly refer to the 
intentionality of structural change. The authors state that the appropriation 
process of technology by actors is guided by intentionality. So the structure, as 
in Barley and Tolbert, can change only when the technical change, intentionally 
appropriated or not, triggers a transformation of social relationships. The 
intentional action reveals its relevance only in the appropriation process of 
technology, so the consequences on the structural change are only indirect and 
unintentional. 
Thus, comparing these major contributions, it can be said that the issue of 
the intentional change is almost ignored. However, a better reflection about this 
topic can be proposed if we consider a second interpretive key of “Giddensian” 
organizational contributions, which starts from a reflection about the concept of 
rationality. 
 
Agency and rationality 
The way human (and organizational) rationality is conceived deeply 
influences the theorization of structure and agency relationship  and structural 
change. Giddens, indeed, give to his “stratification model of agent” a central 
role in ST. “Giddensian” authors, instead, do not show a significant emphasis 
on such aspect. More precisely, three issues can be distinguished. First, several 
authors do not consider the concept of rationality as a problematic one. Second, 
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it seems that a conscious effort to “translate” Giddens’ theory of agent into the 
organizational field is lacking. Third, it seems difficult to trace the theory of 
agent and rationality implicitly proposed by “Giddensian” authors. Barley and 
Tolbert (1997), for example, explicitly put aside such aspect by stating that “.. by 
choosing to focus on the identification and analysis on scripts in our approach, we have 
consciously emphasized the behavioral and the structural rather than the cognitive and 
the cultural”. The authors’ approach is directly finalized to the analysis of the 
connection between agency and structure rather than to define the concept of 
rationality on which the agents’ behavior and choices are based. Similarly, all 
other organizational authors either seem not to consider such aspect as a 
relevant one, or they just directly refer to Giddens’ theory and use it “as is”. 
We argue that this lack of attention can lead to under-estimate the 
relevance of intentionality related to structural change. Also, it can lead to 
ignore the connection between individual and organizational rationality. Such 
connection, in a theory of organizational structure’s duality, is a very relevant 
one and it must be analytically explicited. Do “Giddensian” approaches “deny” 
the existence of a systemic rationality (as proposed by the subjectivist tradition), 
or do they propose a functional rationality (as proposed by functionalist 
theories), or do they propose instead something completely different? The 
“Giddensian” contributions that we analyzed do not provide an answer to this 
crucial question. We think that until this point is not cleared, the way ST can be 
useful to organizational reflection cannot be clear as well. 
 
Structure, duality and dualism 
While the concepts of rationality and agent have not been extensively 
elaborated, the concept of structure received much attention from “Giddensian” 
authors. The goal of Ranson and colleagues (1980) related to structure is similar 
to the one concerning structural variability. While for variability their idea is to 
propose a synthesis between the sources of variability identified by objectivist 
and subjectivist approaches, in the same way the authors propose a conceptual 
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synthesis between the structure seen as formal configuration and as 
institutionalization of recurrent interactions. The synthesis is allowed by a 
conceptual connection represented by the general idea of structure as means of 
control, continuously produced and reproduced in action, constituted by and 
constitutive of action. Thus, they try to grasp both the formal aspect of 
structure, as an enabling and constraining premise to action in terms of 
expectations and prescriptions, and the actual configurations of interactions, as 
they are, in turns, constitutive of the formal framework. In this way, the authors 
grasp the duality of structure in the biunivocal relationship between formal and 
informal elements of structure. 
Barley and Tolbert (1997) propose a recursive model of the action - 
structure relationship based on ST. The crucial premise is represented by the 
analytical and also phenomenological distinction between action and structure: 
“Unless institutions and actions are analytically as well as phenomenologically distinct, 
it is difficult to understand how one can be said to affect the other .. Unless an 
institution exist prior to action, it is difficult to understand how it can affect behavior 
and how one can examine its implications for action or speak of action’s subsequent 
affects on the institution. Thus, to reduce the empirical problem of conflating action and 
institutions, one needs a diachronic model of the structuration process”. Thus, the 
empirical problem concerning the study of the structuration process as a dual 
process must be shifted, according to the authors, to a conceptual level. Indeed, 
the proposed model has a diachronic nature, since the action realm and the 
structural realm influence each other in different and distinguishable moments 
through a mediation mechanism called “script”. Thus, it is possible to criticize 
the contributions of Ranson and Barley in a similar way: if one conceives 
structure as a set of formal rules and typified behaviors, or if one shifts to the 
phenomenological level the distinction between agency and structure, the risk 
of reifying the concept of structure can be rather high. That is, in other words, 
the risk of a syncretic approach to ST in the organizational field. In Ranson’s 
contribution, the syncretism can be seen in the attempt to synthesize 
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conceptions that are epistemologically and ontologically distant. In Barley’s 
contribution, it can be seen in the concrete separation (in space and time) - and 
not only an analytical separation - of action and structure. 
De Sanctis and Poole (1994) detect the double existence of structures in the 
social system and in technologies, structures that are to be conceived as “rules 
and resources provided by technologies and institutions as the basis for human activity 
.. [they]serve as templates for planning and accomplishing tasks”. Also, there is a 
recursive relationship between them, since they “iteratively shape each other”. 
Also, the authors identify other “sources” of structuration besides technology, 
like the social environment, the system of tasks, the embedded culture and so 
forth. This contribution can be fruitfully compared to the Barley’s works on 
technology (1986; 1990), where technology is seen as a source of structuring that 
impacts on social structures. Also, De Sanctis and Poole emphasize the study of 
structural features implied in technology, and show the possibility of mutual 
influence between social and technological structures. The basic principle, 
however, is similar in the two contributions: the ST is used to explain the 
bidirectional relationship between different sources of structuration, between 
different structural “objects” that can be distinguished not analytically, but in 
concrete terms. 
Another interesting comparison can be made between the works of 
Orlikowski (1992), Orlikowski and Robey (1991) and Wilmott (1987). According 
to the former ones, structure can be analyzed according to different 
structuration “modalities”, directly borrowed from Giddens’ work itself. The 
idea of “modality” represents the connection between the action realm and the 
structural realm, thus creating a synthetic framework informed by ST as a meta-
theory. Wilmott, instead, defines structure as a set of structural properties of the 
social system. Thus, structural modalities do not serve as a connection between 
the two realms, but as a characterization of the structural properties : “The 
modalities appear as the structural properties of social systems, as expression of 
signification, domination and legitimization .. [they] are understood to be drawn upon 
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by actors in the production of interaction. And, at the same time, they are the media of 
the reproduction of the structural components of systems of interaction”. 
Other authors proposed interpretations not much different from 
Wilmott’s. Riley (1983), for example, states that : “Structuration .. is the production 
and reproduction of social systems through the application of generative rules and 
resources. In this sense, systems are regularized relations in interaction - not functional 
relationships between parts of a whole .. there is a bias for ‘what has come before’, since 
structures that have been previously drawn upon become part of the stores of knowledge 
available and are themselves reproduced”. Thus, the author is careful not to 
interpret structure neither as functional relationships between separate 
organizational parts (for example, between formal prescriptions and typified 
behaviors, as Ranson and colleagues proposed), nor as a phenomenological 
separation of agency and structural levels (as Barley and Tolbert proposed). 
Instead, Riley maintains an analytical distinction, since structure represents an 
important knowledge premise, only partially conscious, to structural 
reproduction or change through action. Leflaive (1996) holds a similar position, 
as he states that: “Mundane organizational operations .. are sources of information 
and knowledge. They are used by inmates as resources to constitute themselves as 
selves, and to exert some sort of power. At the same time, they sustain the process of 
constitution of their organizational setting (both as a concrete locale and as an 
institution)”.         
    
A general comment about “Giddensian” organizational contributions    
It must be said that, in general, these contributions do not constitute an 
homogeneous stream which could be labeled “structurationist theory of 
organization”. Heterogeneity concerns not only the specific character of the 
various research issues, but also the general interpretation of the framework 
proposed by Giddens.  
From this point of view, we have already stressed the emergence of two 
interpretation modes of ST, which for simplicity we label respectively as “cross-
 20 
 
fertilization” and “third way”. 
The two interpretative modes of ST are not always clearly distinguishable 
in the domain of any single contribution; neither these modes characterize 
unequivocally the positions of each author. However, our goal is not to classify 
the reviewed contributions. We propose this distinction just in ideal-typical 
terms, in order to let emerge how ST can be fruitfully used in the organizational 
field. 
In the first interpretation, ST is placed at the same level of other action 
theories belonging to the two perspectives criticized by Giddens: meeting 
points are looked for, without regard to the different underlying 
epistemologies. In this eclectic approach, a reference to ST is made in order to 
stress both the importance of the institutional constraints on individual action 
and the capability of actors to avoid constraints and to modify institutions. 
Objectivist and subjectivist perspectives are therefore considered to be 
complementary and compatible, unlike those who assert the methodological 
dualism and their absolute incompatibility. 
In the second interpretation, which is the most consistent to the original 
“spirit” of ST, the importance of a dual vision of structure is emphasized. 
Structure is intended both as a medium and as an outcome of social praxis. 
Every act of production of the societal system is at the same time an act of 
reproduction: the same rules and the resources which constrain and render 
action possible, are reproduced through action itself (this is called by Giddens 
the “recursive character” of social life). This “third way” is considered by its 
supporters more useful in order to understand organizational change than the 
dualistic conceptions, which reify agency and structure and situate them in a 
(logical or temporal) hierarchical relation; but it is also alternative to any 
attempt to put reified structures and actions in a relation of reciprocal 
causation. The epistemological differences underlying the different theoretical 
schemes are emphasized, and convergence is searched only among theories that 
originate within the same conception. 
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What does organization theory need in order to go along the path indicated 
by Structuration Theory? 
In organizational thought the need of a new epistemological and 
theoretical frame is widely recognized. This is the fundamental need which, in 
our opinion, pushed a significant number of scholars toward ST. However, the 
cultural conditioning of the traditional perspectives is still strong. 
The result of such influence is, in the worst cases, the loss of the original 
Giddens’ conceptualization about the duality of structure, and the regression to 
the old dualism, typical of the perspectives that one may wish to overcome. 
We try now to identify some fundamental issues which should 
characterize a true “third way”, as opposed to a simple revival, however 
updated in the language, of the two traditional modes. 
1a) A “model of man” as autonomous agent (see Hollis, 1977), competent 
in his social action and, at least partially, of its effects; in this conception agents 
are self-monitoring, purposeful and responsible; their agency is not passively 
determined by exogenous factors. 
1b) A definition of rationality à la Simon (1947), that is, intentional and 
bounded in character. If in the previous point we have identified the purposive 
character of organizational action, here we add the limits in which incurs this 
competence, without surrendering to the conception of organization as a total 
unintended product of agents in interactions. 
2) A process conception of organization, suitable for considering both 
morphostatic and morphogenetic processes. 
3) A particular attention to the concepts of “rule” and “regulation” and to 
the relation existing between the understanding of rules and the conformity to 
them. We want to underline particularly the following sides of regulation: 
- attention must be paid not to the formal rules alone, but to the whole 
spectrum of  rules involved in agency, i.e. formal and informal, tacit and 
discursive, and so forth; a traditional issue of organizational theory, i.e. the 
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interpretation of structural variability, is strictly connected to this point; 
- the reference to the rules and their interpretation, apart from their 
codification modes, is always local and transitory in character. The negotiation 
of local orders carried out by agents lead us to consider the domination and 
power relations which characterize every organizational process. 
4) A concept of structure as a product of intentional actions, which 
assumes an analytic autonomy from the strategic action and which makes 
possible the institutional analysis without neglecting the ability of agents to 
produce changes intentionally, even when they enact the more routinized 
praxis. 
5) A weberian interpretative scheme of the organizational action and of its 
structure. The salient features of such a frame have been partially outlined in 
the previous points. Indeed, Weber conceives organization as: 
- a specific mode of social action (soziales Handeln), i.e. an action which in 
terms of its meaning, as intended by the acting subject, is related to the conduct 
of others and thereby oriented in its course; 
- characterized, in its ideal typical form, by bounded rationality and goal-
orientation; 
- regulative system of collective action. 
We also believe that it is important to accept the methodological 
suggestion which Weber identify as the basis of the study of any type of social 
action. In this respect we need to refer directly to the Weber’s Wissenschaftslehre 
(doctrine of science) (1922b), in which social science is defined as “science of 
reality”. 
Weber opposed to both the application in social sciences of the positivistic 
canons of the knowledge doctrine (science of law) and to the total renunciation 
of any type of explanation of the social phenomena in favour of an idiographic 
approach. 
In the science of reality there is room for both the understanding 
(Verstehen) of the subjectively intended meaning of an action and for the 
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explanation (Erklärung) of the social phenomena through objective and 
checkable procedures. Verstehen and Erklärung are both necessary. The former is 
not to understand merely as empathetic participation; even thought empathy is 
often an important starting point, especially when an emotional context is 
involved, it is not sufficient for the evidence of understanding: it demands a 
rational, and intersubjectively valid, reconstruction of the action-elements in 
their context of meaning. 
The scientific check of the interpretative procedures do not occur through 
the explanation modes of  positivistic source, but through procedures of causal 
imputation, based on “judgement of objective possibility” (objektive 
Möglichkeitsurteile) and on the distinction between “adequate causation” 
(adäquate Verursachung) and “accidental causation” (zufällige Verursachung). 
More in detail, according to the Weber’s methodological arguments: 
- the causes of a social phenomenon are always countless; the researcher 
selects the salient causal conditions referring to its own values-orientation 
(Wertbezogenheit); 
- the studied objects can be interchanged in their roles of causes and effects 
in an alternative explanatory scheme; 
- the causal relation is always understood in a non-deterministic way, 
indeed as objective possibility, separated from the estimation of the likelihood 
of such a possibility; 
- explanation does not merely consist in finding empirical statistical 
regularities, but involves highlighting of the modes by which the objective 
conditions become effective causes through the intentional and self-monitoring 
action of individuals. 
Is it possible to build an organizational theory that, while not being based 
on ST, does include all the above mentioned theoretical and methodological 
aspects? In other words, is it possible to share Giddens’ epistemological 
“challenge” to social science and to organization theory in particular, and to 
build an organization theory within its disciplinary tradition that meets that 
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challenge? We believe it is possible to do so. In fact, there are relevant examples 
of such endeavor. One of them is the Theory of Organizational Action (TAO, 
Maggi 1984/1990; 2003). Although TAO does not build upon ST as a main 
reference, nonetheless it shows how organizational theory can share with ST 
those key features that define its position in the epistemological panorama of 
possibilities. More specifically, as said by Maggi (2003), TAO shares with ST the 
following points: a common reference to a “third” epistemological vision; a 
common conceptualization of structure as both the condition and the 
consequence of action; finally, the fact that ST helps to reinforce the perspective 
of TAO as a theory of social action.   
 
Conclusion 
Our understanding of the relevance of the ST for the study of 
organizational change, presented in this paper, is an integral part of a wider 
project. Besides the points here discussed, the project includes: 
-  a critical comparison of Giddens’ Theory with other important theories 
of social action which could be useful for organizational analysis; 
- a new interpretation of some classical contributions of organization 
theory. 
We believe that it is necessary to look back as well as it is important to 
look ahead. What really matters is to look from a good position: someone 
would suggest doing it “on the shoulders of giants”. 
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